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FUTURE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS:
TEN STEPS TOWARDS UNIFORM PROCEDURES
Kai-Friederike Oelbermann, Friedrich Pukelsheim
Institute for Mathematics, University of Augsburg, Germany
Procedural steps for the European Parliament elections are proposed so as to achieve more
uniformity among the national electoral provisions of the 27 Member States. The steps include
the creation of a European Electoral Authority, the enhancement of the European party system,
and the consolidation of the many diverse seat apportionment methods into the single equality-
oriented divisor method with standard rounding (Webster/Sainte-Lague). The introduction of
semi-open list systems is addressed, as is the formation of a single European constituency for
the election of an additional twenty-ve MEPs. In the long run the translation of votes into
seats could be carried out using the biproportional variant of the divisor method with standard
rounding, in order to better mirror the structure of the European Union.
1. Introduction. Assessing the post-war European integration process Wirsching (2006)
illuminates the contraposition of Wille und Vorstellung. The antagonisms that went along
with the process are reected by the enigmatic character of the European Parliament (EP)
and its predecessor, the Common Assembly. Of all institutions of the European Union,
the EP is the one veering most between Sein und Schein. With a view towards the poor
coverage of European issues in the campaign for the 4{7 June 2009 EP elections and the low
voter turnout, Huber (2009) proposes a strengthening of the political parties at European
level to further develop the legitimizing powers of the EP.
The OSCE/ODIHR (2009) report describes the 2009 EP elections to be essentially
27 separate national elections to a supra-national body : : : characterized by a considerable
diversity of national rules, procedures, and practices. The report predicts that the debate
about the EP's electoral framework is likely to continue during the next legislature. Indeed,
the EP is determined to deal with the topic. Its Constitutional Aairs Committee has
appointed the Member of the EP (MEP) Andrew Du rapporteur on this initiative. An
explanatory statement was issued in April 2010, and a draft report in July 2010. We refer
to these documents as Du (2010a) and Du (2010b).
The elections to the EP are regulated in the 1976 Elections Act, as amended in 2002.
Du (2010a) reviews its history to date. We quote the consolidated version appended as
Annex II to Du (2010b), and refer to it as EA. The OSCE/ODIHR (2009) and Du
(2010b) reports oer a great many suggestions for the amendment of the EA. The present
paper aims at raising the level of uniformity among the 27 national electoral provisions,
leaving aside the problem of how the 751 seats are allocated to the 27 Member States.
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A brief overview of the paper is as follows. Section 2 seconds Du (2010a) in his plea
to set up a European Electoral Authority. In Section 3 we suggest to give the European
parties a functional role in the elections. As proposed by Schleicher (2011) ballot sheets
should show the names of the European parties, and the electoral threshold should be
evaluated only relative to how European parties perform at Union level.
Section 4 distinguishes between the establishment of multiple constituencies, and the
subdivision of an electoral area into several districts. The terms constituency and district
are interpreted in the distinct sense of Oelbermann/Palomares/Pukelsheim (2010), hence-
forth referred to as OPP (2010). Section 5 sets the stage to advance the uniformity level
of the electoral procedures. We replace the (non-visible) European parties by the (visible)
Political Groups in the EP. For the translation of vote counts into seat numbers we solely
employ the divisor method with standard rounding (Webster/Sainte-Lague). With these
prerequisites, Section 6 presents a prototype evaluation of the 2009 EP elections.
Sections 7 and 8 address two specic proposals from Du (2010b), the introduction
of a semi-open list system, and the creation of a single European constituency. In the
light of our simulated evaluation of the 2009 elections we conclude that both proposals
call for further specication before their prospective merits can be assessed. Section 9
points out that the biproportional variant of the divisor method with standard rounding
would conform particularly well with the constitutional character of the European Union.
Section 10 enumerates ten steps which, in the light of this article, seem to be called for to
move the EA in the direction of more uniformity.
Article 223 TFEU1 calls upon the EP to draw up a proposal for the election of its
Members in accordance with a uniform procedure, or in accordance with principles common
to all Member States. The ten steps do not suce to dene a uniform procedure in the
singular. They aim to increase the degree of uniformity among the plurality of procedures
used by the Member States, and to carry the principles common to all Member States to
a level enabling a unionwide view of future EP elections.
2. European Electoral Authority. The biggest obstacle to progress is ignorance.
When compiling the 2009 EP elections overview in OPP (2010), we found that the national
provisions governing the elections in Member States are widely dispersed and hard to get
hold of. Authoritative facts on the elections are not even available on the EP websites. The
information oered is incomplete, nor is it evident whether it is truly reliable. We get the
impression that Parliament itself lacks a rm knowledge on how it gets elected, and how
1 Ocial Journal of the European Union C 83 (30.3.2010) 47{199 [149].
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seats are allocated. After all, the European Union admits twenty-three ocial languages
and operates with three alphabets, Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic. Some Member States make
their national provisions accessible in their mother tongues only. Others provide unocial
translations into English, occasionally with an irritating lack of prociency when it comes
to describing the calculations of converting votes into seats. The OSCE/ODIHR (2009)
report is awed by factual errors, as is the survey of the national electoral provisions
provided by Lehmann (2009), and the annex on current electoral practices in Member
States in Du (2010a). In all likelihood, so is the overview OPP (2010).
In Du's (2010b) list of amendments a prominent item is the creation of a Euro-
pean Electoral Authority. We suggest that such an oce should also serve as a center
of documentation. The EP will soon lose its memory on how it got elected in previous
legislative periods unless legal acts are archived in a central oce. Member States ought
to be obliged to deposit their electoral provisions with the Electoral Authority. As it is
equally laborious and challenging to locate nal vote counts, Member States should also
be obliged to deposit their nal vote counts with the Electoral Authority.
3. European party system. Another obstacle for a move towards more uniformity
is the lack of visibility of the European party system. This is not to say that European
parties do not exist. In 2009 nine of them cashed-in more than ten million Euros from the
Union's general budget.2 However, European parties seem to function like astronomical
black holes. They absorb the money without emanating any political messages. In order
to enhance their visibility Schleicher (2011) puts forward two proposals. The Schleicher
plan proposes to have European parties visibly appear on ballot sheets, and to introduce a
threshold directly aiming for their electoral performance. Before getting to this in greater
detail, we need to be more explicit what we mean by the term European party.
There already exists a precise denition of the meaning of the term political parties at
European level.3 In essence, for a party to qualify as a political party at European level,
it must already be rmly established in the EP, or in national or regional parliaments
of at least a quarter of the Member States. This requirement may be too restrictive for
newcomers to join upcoming EP elections. Therefore we widen the meaning of European
parties to also include political organizations at European level that observe the principles
on which the European Union is founded and that campaign in the prospective EP elections
in at least a quarter of the Member States. European parties, in the wide sense, can be
2 www.europarl.europa.eu/tenders/subventions 2009.htm.
3 Ocial Journal of the European Union L 297 (15.11.2003) 1{4 [2].
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expected to contribute to forming European awareness and to expressing the will of citizens
of the Union, as demanded by Article 10(4) TEU.4 With this wide meaning of European
parties we return to the discussion of the Schleicher plan.
Firstly, European parties should be given a place on the ballot sheets. Current ballot
design is such that domestic parties are listed without indicating any aliation with a
European party. The Schleicher plan assumes that a domestic party seeks membership
with a European party, and that the aliation is prominently exhibited on the ballot
sheets by printing the emblem and the name of the European party ahead of the name of
the domestic party. This would provide at least some clue for voters to see a European
perspective when casting their votes. It would be a start to overcome the current mismatch
that the information on the ballot sheets is restricted to the domestic sphere.
Secondly, the Schleicher plan proposes an electoral threshold at the level of European
parties, by requiring them to attract at least three percent of the valid votes in each of at
least a quarter of the Member States. For the sake of brevity we refer to this stipulation
as the 3-in-7 threshold. When a European party passes the 3-in-7 threshold, all votes cast
for the party anywhere in the 27 Member States become eective and enter into the seat
apportionment calculations. A European party passing the 3-in-7 threshold automatically
the qualies as a political party at European level according to the Union's regulation.
Schleicher accepts further thresholds in national electoral provisions, in addition to
the 3-in-7 threshold. We feel that multiple layers of thresholds are too confusing. After all,
in 2009 the handling of thresholds turned out to be quite diverse, see OPP (2010, Table 1).
A single 3-in-7 threshold would cut back on the creative threshold diversity. We would
rather bar additional domestic thresholds, and make do with the 3-in-7 threshold.
4. Electoral region, area, constituency, and district. In electoral systems the
terms region, area, constituency, and district are not standardized. For EP elections we
dene their meanings as follows. The electoral region comprises all of the European Union.
Since the organization and the evaluation of the elections are particular to each Member
State, we take a Member State to function as an electoral area. According to Article 2
EA it is up to a Member State whether to establish multiple constituencies, or whether to
subdivide its electoral area in a dierent manner.
We give the establishment of constituencies the following meaning. In the presence of
constituencies, the seat contingent of a Member State is apportioned among constituencies
4 Ocial Journal of the European Union C 83 (30.3.2010) 13{45 [20].
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prior to the election as stipulated in the national electoral provisions. Constituencies are
established in Belgium (3 constituencies), France (8), Ireland (4), and the United Kingdom
(12). For instance, in Belgium the three constituencies are formed by the French, Dutch,
and German-speaking parts of the country. The establishment of constituencies is a bottom-
up approach, in that the geographical entities are joined to form the electoral area.
The subdivision into districts appears as a top-down approach. Districts, too, are
subareas, but the electoral system handles them dierently. Firstly, every party is allocated
a statewide seat number in proportion to its statewide vote counts. Secondly, for each party
a subapportionment calculation is carried out allocating the party's statewide seats among
its district lists, again in proportion to vote counts. Three Member States make use of the
subdivision into districts, Germany (16 districts), Italy (5), and Poland (13).
The number of seats available for apportionment in a constituency is called the con-
stituency magnitude. The number of seats eventually ending up within a district is called
the district magnitude. The two concepts dier in that constituency magnitudes are pre-
specied ex ante, while district magnitudes emerge ex post, relative to election day. Our
distinction of an establishment of multiple constituencies, and of a subdivision into several
districts is not generally shared in the literature. Article 2 EA reads as follows:
In accordance with its specic national situation, each Member State may establish
constituencies for elections to the EP or subdivide its electoral area in a dierent
manner, without generally aecting the proportional nature of the voting system.
Du (2010b) amends Article 2 by breaking it into three phrases involving the term
constituencies only, and deleting any reference to a subdivision in a dierent manner:
1. Each Member State may establish constituencies for elections to the EP on a territo-
rial basis. 2. States with a population of at least twenty million shall subdivide their
electoral area into a number of regional constituencies. 3. The establishment of con-
stituencies must not generally aect the proportional nature of the voting system.
Neither Du (2010a) nor Du (2010b) indicate whether the focus on the establishment of
constituencies, and the omission of a subdivision in a dierent manner is intentional. Is it
meant to restrict the margin of discretion which Member States enjoy under the auspices
of the common principles of the EA? The second phrase forces the seven largest Member
States to subdivide their electoral area into constituencies. While Germany is composed
of federal states, its Grundgesetz embodies a rather unitary character. It would seem to
us that the second phrase forces Germany to rewrite its basic law. In Member States such
as Spain the establishment of constituencies might constitute a Herculean task.
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The third phrase sounds innocuous, but may give rise to unwanted questions. We
illustrate its consequences by the Member States that in 2009 made use of the establish-
ment of constituencies, Belgium, France, Ireland, and United Kingdom. In Belgium, the
Deutschsprachiges Wahlkollegium constituency has a single seat available for apportion-
ment. As one seat is not enough to achieve any proportionality whatsoever, the third
phrase is violated. Evidently the constituency is established for reasons of minority rep-
resentation. However, exceptions in favor of minority representation are absent from the
amendment. In France, the Outre-Mer constituency commands just three seats. Not much
proportionality can be achieved with so few seats. Here it is not minority representation
that is decisive, but the particularities of the territorial structure of the constituency.
The other constituencies are void of minority considerations or geographical peculiar-
ities. Still the French Massive Central/Centre constituency commands only ve seats, and
all Irish constituencies and the British North-East constituency are allocated a mere three
seats. Not much proportionality can be achieved with so few seats, raising the question why
voters in these constituencies are deprived of their right to proportional representation.
As for the EP's composition, there is a great brouhaha in Parliament that Member
States must be allocated at least six seats in order to represent the diversity of their
political spectrum. When Member States make use of their margin of discretion they draft
constituencies so small that there is no hope of representing the political spectrum. We
propose to reword the amendment in a more conrmatory manner: 3. The establishment
of constituencies must be such that there are at least six seats available for proportional
representation, unless sucient reason justies a smaller constituency magnitude.
Even a constituency magnitude of six seats entails severe limitations in achieving
proportional representation. The problem is the range of vote shares needed to obtain
representation in Parliament. The range begins with the threshold of representation, and
ends with the threshold of exclusion (Gallagher/Mitchell 2008 [607]). Below the threshold
of representation it is impossible for a party to win a seat. Above the threshold of exclusion
a party is guaranteed a seat. Inbetween the likelihood of winning a seat varies depending
on how the other parties perform. With only a few seats available the range comes to lie
way above ve percent of the valid votes.
In the sequel we rely on the divisor method with standard rounding (Webster/Sainte-
Lague).5 For this method, with six seats available and four parties campaigning, the
5 For the divisor method with standard rounding (Webster/Sainte-Lague), the threshold of representa-
tion is 1=(2h+` 2), and the threshold of exclusion is 1=(2h `+2), with h signifying the constituency
magnitude (\house size"), and ` the number of competing lists (Palomares/Ramrez, 2003).
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threshold of representation amounts to 1=14 = 7 percent, while the threshold of exclusion
is 1=10 = 10 percent. Hence with a vote share below seven percent representation is plainly
impossible. A party needs at least ten percent voter support to be certain to gain a seat. A
threshold of ten percent dees the current ve percent threshold in Article 3 EA. Moreover
it is viewed rather critically by the European Court of Human Rights (2008).
With a constituency magnitude of twelve seats and six parties campaigning, the
threshold of representation falls to 1=28 = 4 percent. The threshold of exclusion amounts
to 1=20 = 5 percent. In 2009 all Member States, except the six smallest, had twelve or more
seats at their disposal. These Member States should be invited to establish constituencies
with magnitude twelve or more, so that the threshold of exclusion does not grow too large.
5. Hypothetical uniformity. The Schleicher plan cannot be directly applied to the
OPP (2010) data for the reason that about twenty domestic parties in the EP are not
aliated with any European party. For the purposes of a hypothetical uniform evaluation
we identify the aliation of domestic parties to Political Groups in the EP, as do Rose
and Bernhagen (2010). We are aware that Political Groups in the EP are not identical to,
nor exchangeable with, European parties. Yet, the simulation is instructive to clarify the
roles of domestic and European parties.
At the beginning of the 2009{2014 legislative period there were seven Political Groups
in the EP, complemented by an eighth pseudo-group, NA, embracing the MEPs not at-
tached to any of the seven proper Political Groups:
Acronym Political Group in the EP Seats
EPP European People's Party 265
S&D Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats 184
ALDE Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 84
Greens/EFA European Greens / European Free Alliance 55
ECR European Conservatives and Reformists 54
GUE/NGL European United Left / Nordic Green Left 35
EFD Europe of Freedom and Democracy 32
NA Non-attached MEPs 27
Total 736
In OPP (2010) we exhibit the name of a domestic party and, separated by a colon \:",
the name of the Political Group to which the party is aliated. Each of the eight Polit-
ical Groups passes the 3-in-7 threshold. Hence their votes enter into the apportionment
processes in all Member States where they campaign. The eight Political Groups and the
votes they draw provide the database for the unionwide evaluation in Table 1.
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Two kinds of problems come to light. Firstly, in Slovakia three domestic parties are
aliated with the Political Group EPP. From a Union viewpoint the EPP submits three
lists to the Slovak electorate. There are more instances where two or more domestic parties
merge their MEPs into the same Political Group. Proportional representation systems do
not admit parties to campaign with two or more lists because this would secure an undue
advantage over their competitors. The EA should demand that, when in a Member State
several domestic parties belong to the same European party, they must submit a single,
joint candidate list within each constituency and within each district.
Secondly, the 2009 elections feature another complication. Two or more parties regis-
ter an alliance (also known as list apparentement), yet the MEPs so elected join dierent
Political Groups. For instance, in Denmark Alliance 1 consists of three parties. The
four MEPs of the rst party join S&D, the two MEPs of the second party go along with
Greens/EFA, and the third party sends no MEP into the EP. So what does it mean when
a citizen casts a vote for a partner of Alliance 1? Is the vote going to help the party of
the voter's choice win a seat, or another partner of the alliance, or does it fail to account
for a seat? The disorientation deprives voters of their right to a direct election. We opt to
exclude the formation of party alliances from EP elections. In fact, party alliances become
superuous as soon as a seat apportionment method is adopted that is neutral towards
size and treats smaller parties as fairly as larger parties.
Democratic representation usually builds on the principle of equal elections, as cap-
tured by the motto one person, one vote. In handling this principle the European Union
proves to be a political body sui generis, torn between degressivity, progressivity, and
proportionality. Degressive representation prevails for the composition of the EP, the al-
location of the 751 seats to the 27 Member States. Degressivity means that a human
being's worth decreases when seen as a citizen of larger Member States, and increases for
citizens of smaller Member States. Progressive representation emerges when the same in-
dividuals are seen as voters of political parties. Progressivity means that a human being's
worth increases for citizens who vote for larger parties, and decreases for voters of smaller
parties. The seat apportionment method manifestly serving progressivity is the divisor
method with rounding down (Jeerson/D'Hondt/Hagenbach-Bischo), employed in 16 of
the 27 Member States in 2009. As far as the translation of vote counts into seat numbers
is concerned, we believe that degressive representation and progressive representation lose
out against proportional representation, as expressed by the one person, one vote principle.
The seat apportionment method harmonizing most convincingly with the one person,
one vote principle is the divisor method with standard rounding (Webster/Sainte-Lague).
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This is the central message of the seminal monograph of Balinski/Young (2001) who cor-
roborate their ndings with a plethora of arguments. In particular, the method is neutral
towards size. Whether larger or smaller in terms of vote counts, every party gets on aver-
age as many seats as it deserves on the grounds of the theoretical Rule of Three. There is
absolutely no need for parties to fake a larger size by registering alliances.
Furthermore, the divisor method with standard rounding (Webster/Sainte-Lague)
comes with the most transparent calculations. Each vote count is divided by a com-
mon divisor, and the resulting quotient is rounded in a standard fashion to obtain the
seat numbers. That is, quotients with a fractional part less than a half are rounded down
to the previous integer. With fractional parts larger than a half, quotients are rounded
up to the next integer. In other words, all quotients get rounded to the whole numbers
nearest to them. The divisor plays the role of an electoral key specifying the number of
voters accounting for \about" (that is, up to rounding) one seat. Thus, in Germany every
236 000 voters account for about one MEP, in Malta it is every 50 000 voters.
6. Prototype evaluation of the 2009 EP elections. The unied evaluation of
the 2009 EP elections revolves around Table 1, complemented by Tables 2 and 3. The
essential items are the pair of numbers separated by a hyphen \-". To the left of a
hyphen we print the vote counts of a Political Group, to the right, the seat numbers hypo-
thetically apportioned to the Group through the divisor method with standard rounding
(Webster/Sainte-Lague).
Table 1 calls for a series of comments. Member States are sorted by population
gures from large to small. The reverse ordering from small to large would be equally
informative. The OSCE/ODIHR report (2009) lists Member States in protocol order.
This injects a considerable amount of randomness, and disguises the eects of size. | The
two-letter code of a Member State is followed by a slash \/" when the State subdivides
its electoral area into several districts (Germany, Italy, Poland). A star \*" indicates that
the State establishes multiple constituencies (France, United Kingdom, Belgium, Ireland).
| Population gures are taken from the Ocial Journal, which publishes these gures for
the qualied majority decisions in the Union's Council of Ministers. Since the rationale for
referring the Council of Ministers' qualied majority decisions to population is concurrent
with the rationale for basing representation in the EP on the Union's citizens, we believe
that in both cases the same gures should be used. Strangely, the Ocial Journal rounds
population gures into multiples of centuries of a hundred citizens, and prints them as
decimal fractions of legions of a thousand citizens. Since EuroStat takes pains not to
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round whole citizens into fractional numbers, we prefer the authentic EuroStat input to
the manipulated Ocial Journal output.6 |The \Seats" column lists the seat contingents
in force for the 2009 elections to allocate the 736 seats among the 27 Member States.
The Political Groups' vote counts are aggregated from OPP (2010). All party alliances
are resolved. Non-attached parties and non-attached independent candidates not winning
a seat are dismissed. | In Spain, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Latvia, some
domestic political party is represented by several MEPs who joined dierent Political
Groups. In these cases we redistributed votes in proportion to how many MEPs joined
which Group. | In Luxembourg voters can mark up to six votes on their ballots. During
the 2009 elections the average number of marks per ballot was A = 1121 305=198 364  5:7.
Therefore we divide the vote counts from Luxembourg by A and round the results to the
nearest whole number. In this way we obtain numbers referring to individuals, not to
ballot sheet marks. | In Ireland, Malta, and the Northern Ireland constituency of the
United Kingdom, where single transferable electoral systems are used, only rst preferences
are entered in Table 1. | The last column quotes the divisors belonging to the divisor
method with standard rounding (Webster/Sainte-Lague). For each Member State the
divisor signies the number of voters justifying about one seat. If degressive proportionality
were a concept of intrinsic value for the EP electoral systems, divisors would be decreasing
so that fewer voters suce to account for about one seat as Member States become smaller.
This is not the case. Due to the high volatility of voter turnouts divisors jump back and
forth, only roughly in line with population gures.
The overall conclusion is rather encouraging. The hypothetically calculated seat num-
bers in Table 1 most often coincide with the actually apportioned seat numbers in OPP
(2010), or they deviate by no more than one seat.
Pageinsert (on even page) Table 1 about here.
Pageinsert (on facing odd page) Tables 2 and 3 about here.
There are two exceptions, France and the United Kingdom. Both States establish
many constituencies, and then allocate seats by applying the divisor method with rounding
6 Ocial Journal of the European Union L 325 (11.12.2009) 35{61 [55{56].
appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=demo pjan&lang=en
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down (Jeerson/D'Hondt/Hagenbach-Bischo). The method is notorious for being biased,
each application promising some bonus seat shares for larger parties at the expense of
smaller parties. When repeated often enough, bonuses (and maluses) materialize almost
surely. In fact, in both States the largest party carries away a bonus of four seats. This
provides some conrmation for our decision to only use the divisor method with standard
rounding (Webster/Sainte-Lague). The latter method is neutral to size, and immune
against any biasing eects from establishing multiple constituencies.
Germany, Italy, and Poland subdivide their electoral areas into several districts. The
statewide seats of a Political Group from Table 1 need to be subapportioned among dis-
tricts. As an illustration, the top part of Table 2 exhibits the calculations for Italy.
Italy constitutes a particular challenge to the advancement of the EA. The challenge
arises not only from a quantitative, procedural analysis, but also from the normative,
judicial viewpoint. The Italian national provisions are blatantly self-contradictory. Is this
solely an Italian issue? Could non-Italian Union citizens voting in Italy feel impaired in
their electoral rights and go to court? To which court?
The seat apportionment method actually used in Italy is a variant of the Hare quota
method with residual t by greatest remainders. With this method, district magnitudes
in the 2009 EP election come out to be 21, 15, 15, 15, and 6, see OPP (2010). However,
Article 2 of the Italian electoral provisions prespecies the magnitudes in proportion to
population.7 The law stipulates the district magnitudes to be 19, 13, 14, 18, and 8. None of
the districts is allocated the number of seats legally specied in Article 2. The prespecica-
tion of the district magnitudes is at odds with the instructions on how votes get translated
into seats. Pennisi/Ricca/Simeone (2006, 2009) severely criticize the bacchi e bucchi in the
Italian electoral systems, to no avail. The bug persists. The solution to the problem is the
biproportional apportionment method used in the Swiss Cantons of Zurich, Schahausen
and Aargau, see Pukelsheim/Schuhmacher (2004), Balinski/Pukelsheim (2006). Its appli-
cation to the Italian data is displayed in the bottom part of Table 2.
The biproportional solution provides the tool to t France, United Kingdom, and
Belgium into the hypothetical, uniform evaluation in Table 1. Table 3 exemplies the
calculations for Belgium, the top part showing the novel joint biproportional evaluation,
the bottom part current separate per-constituency evaluations. For the biproportional
application, the vote count for a Political Group in a constituency is divided by two
7 Legge 24 gennaio 1979, n. 18 { Elezione dei membri del Parlamento europeo spettanti all'Italia (G.U.
30 gennaio 1979 n. 29), executed through Decreto del 1o aprile 2009 (G.U. Serie generale 3 aprile
2009 n. 78).
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divisors, the constituency divisor and the group divisor. The resulting quotient is rounded
to the nearest seat number. Constituency magnitudes and statewide party seat numbers
are met precisely. As before the seat numbers obtained deviate from the actual allocation
by at most a single seat transfer. France and the United Kingdom would call for similar
tables. Since the biproportional evaluation meets the Groups' statewide seat numbers,
the threshold of exclusion that becomes relevant originates from the Member State's seat
contingent, not from constituency magnitudes. Small magnitudes no longer entail high
thresholds of exclusion.
7. Semi-open list systems? Du (2010a), in drawing conclusions, proposes the com-
pulsory use of the preferential semi-open list system as if there were only a single such
system. Without describing in detail which semi-open list system is being proposed it
remains speculation to talk about its prospective merits. The proposed introduction of a
semi-open list system correlates with the proposition that Member States with a popula-
tion of at least twenty million shall establish multiple constituencies. Presumably ballot
sheets are feared to otherwise reach poster size and become too unwieldy for voters to
eciently handle their semi-open choice.
In any case, if the EP desires to cap the size of constituencies, population gures are
an inappropriate index to use. After all, the EP assigns degressive weights to batches of
twenty million citizens consisting of Romanians, Poles, Spaniards, Italians, Englishmen,
Frenchmen, and Germans. The index to refer to is constituency magnitude. Parliament
may decree a largest constituency magnitude of twenty-ve seats or the like, in addition
to a smallest constituency magnitude of six seats.
8. A unionwide constituency for twenty-ve additional MEPs? Du (2010b)
takes up the long-standing proposal to elect an additional twenty-ve MEPs from a single
constituency formed by the Union region. The goal is to enhance the European dimension
of EP elections, and to increase the representative capability of the EP. We wonder how
the proposal would work out.
Assuming that prospective second votes for the unionwide list run more or less in
parallel to the (rst) votes shown in Table 1, each 5 600 000 votes account for about one
of the twenty-ve seats. The EPP would be awarded nine seats, S&D seven, ALDE three,
Greens/EFA two, and ECR, EFD, GUE/NGL, and NA one each. Contemplating the
EPP column of Table 1, the nine EPP seats go to Italy, Germany, Spain, France, Poland,
Romania, Greece, Hungary, and Portugal. The allocation of the unionwide seats of the
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other Political Groups is similarly predictable. Altogether not much of an election is going
on. Rather, twenty-ve safe EP tickets are dealt out among the larger Member States.
Du (2010b) is silent where the additional twenty-ve seats are thought to originate
from. If \additional" is taken literally, they are created in addition to the existing 751
seats. The creation must appear a sheer nightmare to all believers in degressivity, since all
of these seats will go to the larger Member States. Alternatively, the \additional" seats
may be subtracted from the 751 total, and diminish the contingents of the Member States
of the successful candidates. In essence, the larger Member States would have to upgrade
seats from the domestic level to the Union level although they are already facing a reduced
contingent due to degressivity.
Another imbalance may entail consequences needing attention. The twelve million
EPP voters in Italy would be strong enough to carry two EP seats. A rst option is to
place two Italian candidates on the EPP list. We doubt whether the EPP partners would
tolerate so much progressivity in favor of Italy. A second option is that the Italian EPP
branch aggressively campaigns on behalf of the Lithuanian candidate, say, so that enough
Italian EPP voters use the semi-openness of the list to vote the Lithuanian candidate into
Parliament in addition to the Italian candidate. The idea of a unionwide constituency for
the election of twenty-ve additional MEPs would seem to require further contemplation.
9. Uniformity via biproportionality? Advances on the EP electoral systems hinge on
the functioning of a European party system. Only when German voters of Angela Merkel's
Christlich Demokratische Union acknowledge that their votes may be instrumental for a
candidate of Silvio Berlusconi's Popolo della Liberta to win an EP seat, for the reason
that both parties are aliated with the European People's Party, can we safely aggregate
votes on the Union level and evaluate them unionwide. Rather than limiting ourselves
to the unionwide election of an extra twenty-ve MEPs, we then may allocate all 751
seats in a unionwide biproportional calculation. The biproportional halves of Tables 2
and 3 point the way how to simultaneously respect Member States' seat contingents and
parties' unionwide seat numbers. From the computational viewpoint twenty-seven Member
States and eight Political Groups are handled in the same fashion as are ve districts and
four Political Groups in Italy or three constituencies and six Political Groups in Belgium.
Currently, acceptance of vote aggregation on the Union level remains Zukunftsmusik.
14 Kai-Friederike Oelbermann / Friedrich Pukelsheim
10. Conclusion. In the Council of Europe Venice Commission (2002) all 27 Member
States take account of Europe's electoral heritage of conducting parliamentary elections by
direct universal surage in a free, equal and secret ballot.8 Morevover the Union intends to
accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.9 Paying due attention to the principle of electoral equality would also help
rectifying misunderstandings concerning the EP's democratic legitimization as voiced in
the Lisbon decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court.10
All elections terminate with counting votes. The nal vote counting processes for the
EP elections require synchronization. With current election days ranging from Thursday
to Sunday, a compromise median day appears to be a Saturday. When polling stations
in Greece are kept open from 9 to 18 hours, in Italy from 8 through 17, and in Portugal
from 7 to 16, they close at the same point in time. Vote counting would take place
simultaneously Saturday evening. National electoral oces might process the data during
Sunday morning. The European Electoral Authority could issue preliminary nal results
Sunday afternoon, to make it into the Monday newspapers.
In conclusion, we hold that the following ten steps would be helpful to move in the
direction of more uniform procedures for the EP elections.
1. A European Electoral Authority is created. Member States are invited to deposit
their national electoral provisions and nal electoral results with the Authority.
2. Ballot sheets exhibit emblems and names of European parties ahead of aliated do-
mestic parties.
3. Domestic parties that belong to the same European party submit a joint list.
4. Alliances of European parties (also known as list apparentements) are not allowed.
5. Votes become eective to enter into the seat apportionment calculations only (a) if
cast for a European party attracting at least three percent of the valid votes in each
of at least a quarter of the Member States, or (b) if cast for a domestic party that
the Member State recognizes as a minority representation party, or (c) if cast for
an independent candidate who passes the threshold for independent candidates as
stipulated by the Member States' national provisions.
6. Every Member State may establish multiple constituencies, or subdivide its electoral
area into several districts.
7. Each constituency must be large enough to provide for at least six seats, unless su-
cient reason justies a smaller constituency magnitude.
8 wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=743357.
9 Article 6(2) TEU, Ocial Journal of the European Union C 83 (30.3.2010) 13{45 [19].
10 www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630 2bve000208.html.
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8. For list systems, the translation of votes into seats is based on the divisor method
with standard rounding (Webster/Sainte-Lague), or its biproportional variant.
9. The EP is elected by direct universal surage in a free, equal and secret ballot, as
guaranteed in Articles 9 and 14(3) TEU. Degressive proportionality is relegated to
issues concerning the composition of the EP as in Article 14(2) TEU.
10. Election day is a Saturday in May. Polling stations close at 16h GMT.
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EP2009EU Eective Seats EPP S&D ALDE Greens/EFA ECR EFD GUE/NGL NA State
Population votes divisor
DE/16 82 002 356 23 492 551 99 9 968 153-42 5 472 566-23 2 888 084-12 3 194 509-14 1 969 239-8 236 000
FR*8 64 350 759 13 962 586 72 4 799 908-25 2 838 160-15 1 455 841-7 2 803 759-14 257 437-1 915 634-5 891 847-5 195 000
UK*12 61 576 144 14 272 420 72 2 460 249-12 2 107 312-11 1 767 218-9 4 131 386-21 2 498 226-12 126 184-1 1 181 845-6 200 000
IT/5 60 045 068 26 566 217 72 12 966 334-35 7 997 770-22 2 476 695-7 3 125 418-8 370 000
ES 45 828 172 15 055 459 50 6 670 377-22 6 141 784-20 808 246-3 689 062-2 294 124-1 451 866-2 300 000
PL/13 38 135 876 6 714 370 50 3 787 998-28 908 765-7 2 017 607-15 135 000
RO 21 498 616 4 700 305 33 2 074 019-14 1 504 218-11 702 974-5 419 094-3 143 100
NL 16 485 787 4 329 693 25 913 233-5 548 691-3 1 034 065-6 412 537-2 155 270-1 169 882-1 323 269-2 772 746-5 170 000
EL 11 260 402 4 749 540 22 1 655 722-7 1 878 982-9 178 987-1 366 637-2 669 212-3 221 000
PT 10 627 250 3 135 493 22 1 427 300-10 946 475-7 761 718-5 140 000
BE*3 10 750 000 6 297 484 22 1 288 422-5 1 259 998-4 1 485 854-5 1 319 341-5 296 699-1 647 170-2 283 000
CZ 10 467 542 1 785 106 22 180 451-2 528 132-7 741 946-9 334 577-4 80 000
HU 10 030 975 2 716 882 22 1 632 309-13 503 140-4 153 660-1 427 773-4 122 000
SE 9 256 347 2 876 374 18 744 851-5 773 513-5 603 799-4 575 029-3 179 182-1 165 000
AT 8 355 260 2 693 766 17 858 921-5 680 041-4 284 505-2 870 299-6 157 000
BG 7 606 551 2 186 523 17 832 510-7 476 618-4 569 343-4 308 052-2 127 000
DK 5 511 451 2 172 779 13 297 199-2 503 439-3 474 041-3 371 603-2 357 942-2 168 555-1 170 000
SK 5 412 254 709 004 13 324 081-6 264 722-5 74 241-1 45 960-1 50 000
FI 5 326 314 1 634 235 13 455 874-4 292 051-2 418 251-3 206 439-2 162 930-1 98 690-1 120 000
IE*4 4 450 014 1 703 350 12 532 889-4 254 669-2 525 375-3 34 585-0 99 709-1 256 123-2 151 000
LT 3 349 872 452 503 12 147 756-4 102 347-3 88 870-2 46 293-1 67 237-2 40 000
LV 2 261 294 594 935 8 245 288-3 77 447-1 59 326-1 76 436-1 58 991-1 77 447-1 80 000
SI 2 032 362 384 286 7 200 429-4 85 407-1 98 450-2 57 000
EE 1 340 415 375 279 6 48 492-1 34 508-1 164 383-2 116 830-2 8 860-0 2 206-0 67 000
CY 796 875 296 555 6 109 209-2 67 794-2 12 630-0 106 922-2 44 000
LU:A 493 500 171 158 6 62 133-2 38 659-2 36 995-1 33 371-1 25 000
MT 413 609 242 205 5 100 486-2 135 917-3 5 802-0 50 000
Sum 499 665 065 144 271 058 736 52 324 344-259 36 776 062-182 16 084 775-82 12 070 013-60 7 610 712-50 7 153 584-31 6 280 876-37 5 970 692-35
Table 1: Hypothetical 2009 per-State seat apportionment by Political Groups, using the divisor method with standard rounding (Webster/Sainte-Lague). For
each Member State, a Political Group's vote count is divided by the state divisor. The resulting quotient is rounded to the nearest seat number, printed
after the hyphen \-". [Sources: Member States' two-letter codes from Interinstitutional Style Guide publications.europa.eu/code/. Population gures
ameliorated from Ocial Journal L 325 (11.12.2009) 35{61 [55{56]. Vote counts aggregated from OPP (2010) as described in Sections 5 and 6.]
EP2009IT Magnitude EPP S&D ALDE EFD District
Statewide seats 72 35 22 7 8 divisor
Nord-Occidentale 21 3 395 613-9 2 002 790-5 663 495-2 1 684 842-5
Nord-Orientale 15 2 274 579-6 1 772 850-5 454 801-1 1 204 785-3
Italia Centrale 14 2 685 918-7 2 030 062-6 483 471-1 186 988-0
Italia Meridionale 16 3 452 186-10 1 575 928-4 688 368-2 39 521-0
Italia Insulare 6 1 158 038-3 616 140-2 186 560-1 9 282-0
Group divisor 360 000 367 000 350 000 374 000
Nord-Occidentale 19 3 395 613-8 2 002 790-5 663 495-2 1 684 842-4 1.1
Nord-Orientale 13 2 274 579-5 1 772 850-4 454 801-1 1 204 785-3 1.1
Italia Centrale 14 2 685 918-7 2 030 062-5 483 471-1 186 988-1 1
Italia Meridionale 18 3 452 186-11 1 575 928-5 688 368-2 39 521-0 0.8
Italia Insulare 8 1 158 038-4 616 140-3 186 560-1 9 282-0 0.64
Group divisor 410 000 370 000 370 000 370 000
Table 2: Hypothetical 2009 Italian district subapportionments by Political Groups. Statewide seat numbers are taken from Table 1. Top: Separate per-group
evaluations. For each Political Group, a district's vote count is divided by the group divisor, and rounded. Bottom: Joint biproportional evaluation. District
magnitudes are prespecied in the Italian electoral provisions. The vote count of a Political Group in a district is divided by the group divisor and by the
district divisor, and rounded. All district magnitudes are law-abiding.
EP2009BE Magnitude EPP S&D ALDE Greens/EFA ECR NA Constituency
Statewide seats 22 5 4 5 5 1 2 divisor
Nederlands kiescollege 13 948 123-3 539 393-1 837 884-3 751 235-3 296 699-1 647 170-2 270 000
College electoral francais 8 327 824-1 714 947-3 640 092-2 562 081-2 230 000
Deutschsprachiges Wahlkollegium 1 12 475-1 5 658-0 7 878-0 6 025-0 10 000
Group divisor 1 1 1 0.9 1 1
Nederlands kiescollege 13 948 123-3 539 393-2 837 884-3 751 235-2 296 699-1 647 170-2 260 000
College electoral francais 8 327 824-1 714 947-3 640 092-2 562 081-2 230 000
Deutschsprachiges Wahlkollegium 1 12 475-1 5 658-0 7 878-0 6 025-0 10 000
Table 3: Hypothetical 2009 Belgium constituency subapportionment by Political Groups. Constituency magnitudes are prespecied in the Belgium electoral
provisions, statewide seat numbers are taken from Table 1. Top: Joint biproportional evaluation. The vote count of a Political Group in a constituency is
divided by the group divisor and by the constituency divisor, and rounded. Bottom: Separate per-constituency evaluations. For each constituency, a Polit-
ical Group's vote count is divided by the constituency divisor, and rounded. Statewide seats are missed due to a seat transfer between S&D and Greens/EFA.
